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Abstract 
This paper studies how decentralization affects poverty, vulnerability, and inequality in 
Morocco, in the context of ongoing regionalization reforms. We use different non-parametric 
approaches to assess spending efficiency of Moroccan municipalities and regions over the 
period 2005-2009. The results indicate that the efficiency of spending in improving pro-poor 
outcomes is dependent on the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. While the impact 
of transfer dependency is not statistically significant, more granular data show that formula-
based (unconditional) transfers significantly improve spending efficiency when the opposite is 
true for ad-hoc (conditional) transfers. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of political 
decentralization and find that local spending is less efficient in regions where municipal 
governments have a greater responsibility for spending compared to the regional 
government. This finding also holds in more fragmented regions with a high number of 
municipalities. Finally, we test whether there is an electoral budget cycle in Morocco and find 
that spending efficiency decreases the year of local elections, but increases with the level of 
education of elected officials. 
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Decentralization, Morocco, Poverty, Vulnerability, Inequality, Public spending efficiency, Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Partial Frontier Analysis. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic poverty and vulnerability, and income inequality remain some of the most 
challenging public policy problems in many emerging and developing economies. One central 
question for academics and policymakers has been how to enhance the role of government 
taxation and spending policies to affect income redistribution and promote socio-economic 
development. In many countries, governments have promoted decentralization as a mean to 
achieve these goals through improved economic efficiency, and two principal arguments have 
supported this view. One argument is that decentralization prevents agency problems between 
national and local governments and the latter are assumed to be better able to adapt policy 
measures to local needs ( Oates, 1972; Nativel and Sunley, 2002; OECD, 2003; Balaguer-Coll 
et al., 2010). Another argument is that decentralization by enhancing transparency, public 
accountability, and political participation tend to incentivize local authorities to make efficient 
spending decisions (Putnam, 1993; Seabright, 1995). 
In Morocco, the government has engaged in a consolidation of decentralization reforms to 
enable the regions to effectively promote, in partnership with other subnational governments, 
balanced socio-economic development through territorial-based policies (World Bank, 2009a). 
Indeed, the Constitution of 20111 emphasized the preeminent role of the region in coordinating 
and integrating the visions, plans and programs of other subnational authorities, while taking 
into account their autonomy and respective competencies. In this perspective, the advanced 
decentralization process should make it possible to overcome major deficits in health, 
education, road infrastructure, and access to electricity among others. These sectors are directly 
linked to human development and overlap with the prerogatives that are increasingly devolved 
to the regions. However, the question of the relevance of these reforms arises as 
decentralization may end up aggravating inter-regional disparities without correcting intra-
regional disparities (Tiebout, 1956). In Morocco, disparities between regions have remained 
broadly stable over the last few years (Figure 1). Thus, the central question is whether the 
decentralization process has been successful so far in enabling regions to reduce poverty, 
vulnerability, and inequality notably through more efficient spending. Morocco has 
                                                     
1 http://www.maroc.ma/fr/system/files/documentspage/BO5964BISFr.pdf. 
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experienced a sharp reduction of poverty and vulnerability recently, although at different paces 
in rural and urban areas. However, income inequality remains relatively high. 
Figure 1: Evolution of poverty and vulnerability in Morocco 
  
  
Source: Haut-Commissariat du Plan and authors’ calculations. 
 
The empirical literature on decentralization in developing countries is relatively scant due to 
the lack of longitudinal data on the lower levels of government, and most existing analyses are 
15,3
7,6
25,1
22,8
16,6
30,5
8,9
4,9
14,4
17,4
12,7
23,6
4,8
1,6
9,5
12,5
7,9
19,4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
Poverty Vulnerability
Trends in economic poverty and vulnerability in Morocco
2001 2007 2014
40,6
16,2
40,7
14,7
39,5
14,1
0
10
20
30
40
50
Income inequality (National) Income inequality (between regions)
Trends in income inequality and regional disparities in 
Morocco
2001 2007 2014
Études et Documents n° 5, CERDI, 2018
  7 
cross-country studies. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to contribute to this literature by 
assessing the impact of decentralization on poverty, vulnerability, and income distribution in 
Morocco. Several aspects of decentralization will be investigated, including the effectiveness 
of political and fiscal decentralization. Additionally, this work goes beyond the traditional 
analysis of the effects of decentralization in the context of the existing literature, and makes 
two important contributions: first, it assesses if the effects of intergovernmental transfers vary 
depending on whether they are allocated according a transparent formula (unconditional 
transfers) or on an ad-hoc basis (conditional transfers). Second, it assesses whether the sharing 
of spending responsibilities and the fragmentation of municipalities and regions affect 
spending efficiency. 
The study is based on a sample of 16 regions and 1503 municipalities and covers the period 
2005-2009. Using different nonparametric approaches to measure efficiency, we find that 
regions with higher budgets display less efficient spending. However, when local authorities 
are able to finance a larger part of their spending by raising their own revenues, spending is 
more efficient in reducing poverty, vulnerability, and inequality. Turning to our main 
contributions, we find that while overall transfer dependency does not significantly affect 
spending efficiency, more granular information on different types of transfers show that 
transfers based on a transparent allocation formula improve spending efficiency, whereas the 
opposite is true when transfers are allocated to subnational governments in a discretionary 
fashion. Another important finding is that spending is less efficient in regions where municipal 
governments are responsible for more public spending compared to the regional government. 
Moreover, regions that are more fragmented also have weaker performance in terms of 
spending efficiency. Finally, we test the existence of an electoral budget cycle and political 
accountability and find that in Morocco, spending efficiency decreased the year of local 
elections. When we look more closely at the characteristics of elected officials, our results also 
show that the higher their level of education the more efficient the local government is in the 
use of public resources. 
Overall, the results suggest that the Moroccan central government, in promoting advanced 
regionalization, needs to encourage efficiency-enhancing behavior while taking into account 
local governments' financial and decision-making power constraints. Compared to 
municipalities, regions must be given a more prominent role in spending in order to ensure a 
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territorial coherence of local policy making; they could also serve as intermediate entities 
between the central government and the municipalities. Indeed, an appropriate balance of 
multi-tier decentralization is essential to promote an effective and efficient functioning of 
subnational governments, and the latter could also help achieve higher human development if 
their financial resources are carefully designed and tailored to their new responsibilities. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the relevant 
literature and section III presents an overview of decentralization in Morocco. Section IV 
describes the methodology and data. Section V presents the main results and goes through 
several robustness checks of the main results. Finally, Section VI concludes.  
II.  REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
II.1 Decentralization and spending efficiency 
The arguments in favor of decentralization have been built around efficiency gains, due to the 
greater capacity of decentralized systems to match service provision to the preferences of 
citizens. According to Balaguer-Coll et al., (2010), decentralization can be a solution to agency 
problems between national and local governments. They argue that local governments are 
better placed to respond to local needs, making public policies more effective. This 
corresponds to Oates's (1972) decentralization theorem, which provides for greater efficiency 
in the provision of public services when this responsibility is devolved to lower levels of 
government that are closer to people and better informed of their needs than the central 
government. Tiebout, (1956) also underscores the role of inter-territorial competition in 
contributing to greater local efficiency. Competition at the local and regional level tends to 
encourage governments to focus on the efficient production of public goods and services. 
Putnam (1993) also argues that decentralized systems have an indirect positive effect on 
effectiveness because they tend to be more accountable, transparent, and increase political 
participation. Thiessen, (2003) states that smaller jurisdictions are better able to adapt their 
policies to the specific preferences of their populations and the greater the variation in 
preferences, the greater the potential benefits of decentralization.   
These arguments have been supported by some empirical research. Borger and Kerstens, 
(2000) study of Belgian municipalities is a pioneering empirical analysis of local government 
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efficiency. They find a positive and significant relationship between high local tax rates and 
spending efficiency. They also underscore the necessity of considering the source of financing 
of the region's expenditures, as their efficiency is directly subject to the main source of 
revenues.  Similarly, Otsuka et al., (2010) show that transfers from the Japanese central 
government to local governments had a negative impact on their performance as government 
funding reduced their motivation towards efficient use of taxpayers' money in the supply of 
public goods. A study by Grassmueck and Shields, (2010) for the US shows that regions with 
fragmented governmental structures perform better. However, they do not suggest that 
fragmented regional government units are more efficient in producing and providing public 
goods, but argue that households and firms may be willing to forego additional efficiency for 
more localized control over public policies. Akai and Sakata, (2002) also report a positive 
association between fiscal decentralization and economic performance in the US, as do Zhang 
and Zou, (2001) for the case of India. 
However, there is another strand of literature that points towards the dangers of 
decentralization. According to Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, (2003) a national supply of public 
goods and services may, under certain circumstances, be more effective than their supply at 
the regional or local level. Such circumstances include the existence of economies of scale and 
scope, where there are difficulties in assigning powers in a non-overlapping manner, and where 
there is greater potential for local corruption. The recent literature on fiscal federalism has also 
pointed to an increase in inefficiency linked to the influx of tax revenues, which may induce 
local authorities to relax their budget constraint. Weingast, (2009) states that local governments 
that strive to mobilize more own revenues tend to provide more public services, are more 
accountable and less corrupt. Additionally, the theory of the political agency predicts that the 
problem of the principal-agent in the context of the sharing of responsibility in a multi-level 
government can lead to an under-provision of public services due to the dysfunction of local 
democracy and lack of coordination due to insufficient access to information (Shleifer et al., 
1993; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). Besides, some authors have highlighted that the 
transfer of powers from national elites to local elites increases the possibilities of exacerbating 
corruption as it promotes relations based on proximity between civil servants and individuals 
or interest groups (Tanzi, 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1998; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000; 
De Mello and Barenstein, 2001).  
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II.2 Decentralization and pro-poor outcomes 
Decentralization and pro-poor outcomes have come jointly into focus through the search for 
good governance and related human development implications (Dethier, 2000). However, 
most studies related to decentralization and human development have focused on income 
inequality. In fact, many authors have underscored the important role decentralization plays in 
explaining both regional disparities and inequalities between individuals (Chu, Davoodi, and 
Gupta 2000; Galli and Hoeven 2001; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Lundberg and Squire 2003). 
Tiebout, (1956) and Prud’homme, (1995) describe the phenomenon of “voting by feet,” which 
makes it possible to reduce income inequality within each region (due to the immigration of 
the poor and the emigration of the rich), while leaving constant or aggravating inequality at the 
national level. Sepulveda et al., (2010) estimate the effect of fiscal decentralization on income 
inequality and find that it depends on the size of the government and that fiscal decentralization 
reduces income inequality, if the general government represents at least 20% of the economy. 
Treisman, (2002) finds a positive impact of decentralization on infrastructure quality, but a 
negative effect of a multi-tier government structure on education and health services where 
corruption is prevalent. Other related empirical work has examined the effect of 
decentralization on inequality within regions. Tselios et al., (2011) investigate this relationship 
from a panel of 102 European Union regions over the 1995–2000 period. They find that greater 
fiscal decentralization reduces regional inequality, but this effect declines with rising levels of 
regional per capita income. Goerl and Seiferling, (2014) find that expenditure decentralization 
can have a significant effect on income inequality under certain circumstances including a large 
government sector, and a comprehensive decentralization of redistributive government 
spending. Subnational governments also have to rely primarily on their own revenue sources 
as opposed to intergovernmental transfers. 
In general, there is no theoretical or empirical consensus on the link between decentralization 
and economic efficiency. Therefore, the effectiveness of decentralized systems will vary from 
country to country, contingent upon their underlying characteristics and institutions. The 
following sections will explore if decentralization has affected pro-poor outcomes in the 
Moroccan context through improved efficiency.  
III.  OVERVIEW OF DECENTRALIZATION IN MOROCCO 
Études et Documents n° 5, CERDI, 2018
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III.1 Legal framework 
In Morocco, the process of decentralization has gone through different steps as laws and 
regulatory provisions have been adopted to expand the prerogatives and resources of local 
governments. The first Communal Charter dates back to 1960, later replaced by the Communal 
Charter of 1976; the latter was amended in 1992 and 2002 (Law 78-00). In 2008, the 
Government initiated a revision of the 2002 Charter to provide inter alia formal legal status to 
groupings of municipalities and enable them to act as special purpose vehicles. One of the main 
pillars of the last charter was to provide local councils with margins and tools for an adequate 
financial resource base to cope with responsibilities devolved to them by the central 
government. The responsibilities and powers of the local governments were further defined, 
the status of local councilors was improved, and the revenue base broadened. It also unified 
management of cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, which had previously been 
hampered by a fragmentation across district councils, under the authority of a central 
communal council. There are presently three tiers of local government in Morocco: the regions, 
the provinces and prefectures, and the urban and rural municipalities2.  
The overarching aim of decentralization in Morocco is to support broad-based regionalization 
based on a territorial approach. This entails the promotion of regional economic development 
poles through a reorganization of the current administrative structures of the provinces and 
prefectures, and a stronger mandate for the regions to lead the socio-economic development 
agenda in their respective territories. For instance, several responsibilities have been 
transferred to local governments such as the creation and maintenance of hospitals, lycées, and 
university institutes; the training of personnel at the subnational level; and the development of 
regional infrastructure. However, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Economy and 
Finance retain some control over decisions taken by the local councils through the tutelle on a 
series of measures. The preparation and execution of sub-national budgets remain under the 
supervision of the central government. All sub-national budgets need to be submitted to and 
approved by the central government before they can be approved by the local assemblies. The 
tutelle also requires the use of budget surpluses generated during capital budget 
                                                     
2 The decree 2-97-246 of August 1997 established 16 regions, 75 provinces and prefectures, and 1503 
municipalities. Since the decree 2-15-40 of February 2015, the number of regions has been reduced to 12 while 
the number of municipalities increased to 1538. 
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implementation to be pre-approved. Besides, funding agencies such as the Communal 
Equipment Fund (FEC) have been set up by the central government to partially fill investment 
gaps at the local level. 
III.2 Subnational financial resources 
Local governments budgets represent around 10 percent of the State budget and this ratio has 
remained stable over the past few years (World Bank, 2009b). However, there is an imbalance 
in how resources are shared between the different levels of governments. On average regional 
government budgets represent only 5 percent of subnational budgets while municipal budgets 
represent close to 80 percent. The remaining 15% are the provinces and prefectures' budgets. 
Subnational expenditures are characterized by the predominance of current expenditures which 
represent around 70% of the total, leaving little room for capital expenditures. However, when 
we look at the composition of expenditures at each level of local government, regional 
governments allocate a larger share of their budget to investment (77%), where municipal 
governments allocate only 28% of their budget. 
Local governments financial resources consist of their own-source revenues, ceded revenues 
from the central government, intergovernmental transfers, and loans. Some local governments 
also have additional resources from past budget surpluses and natural resources royalty 
payments3.   
Own revenues: Local own revenues are managed and collected by the 
municipal/regional government, which determines the tax base and the tax rate. For municipal 
governments, these taxes include the tax on undeveloped urban land, the tax on building 
operations, the social solidarity contribution on the construction of housing units, the beverage 
tax, the tourist tax, the tax on bottled water, the tax on public transport and the tax on the 
extraction of quarry and mineral products. For regional governments, these consist of the tax 
on hunting licenses, the tax on mining, and the tax on port services. 
Local own revenues represented on average 21% of subnational government revenues 4 in 
2009, both in urban and rural areas. 
                                                     
3 Typically in regions where Phosphate, Silver, Coal, Lead, Zinc, etc… are exploited. 
4 Revenues excluding past budget surpluses. 
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 Ceded revenues: for municipal governments, ceded revenues managed by the central 
tax administration include the residence tax (which replaced the property tax in 2007) which 
is only collected in urban municipalities, the tax on communal services, and the business 
license fees. The central tax administration retains 10% of the amount collected to cover its 
collection costs, and redistributes the remaining 90% to municipalities. The tax base and the 
tax rate are set annually in the central government Finance Act.  
As for local own revenues, ceded revenues averaged 21% in 2009. These two sources of 
revenues together represent less than half of subnational revenues. Moreover, the revenues 
collected on behalf of rural municipalities stood at only 6.5% of their revenues compared to 
24% of urban municipalities' revenues. 
 Transfers: since 1996, Morocco allocates to municipalities a share of the total VAT 
revenues collected according to an explicit formula which considers their fiscal capacity and 
their tax effort (see table 1). Thus, 30% of the VAT revenues are transferred to municipalities 
and provinces while 1% of the corporate tax and the income tax revenues is transferred to 
regions. These transfers aim at reducing both vertical and horizontal imbalances, and to 
incentivize local governments to improve local revenue mobilization.  
Local governments in Morocco also receive a second type of transfers called conditional or 
ad-hoc transfers. These represent 5% of VAT revenues and are allocated for specific purposes, 
including infrastructure construction, social and urban development, environmental protection, 
emergency funding for natural disasters or epidemics. Ad-hoc transfers are completely 
discretionary and the amount received by subnational governments may depend on the 
bargaining power of the local authorities.   
Intergovernmental transfers represented on average 48% of subnational revenues in 2009, 
however they contribute more significantly to rural municipalities' revenues with an average 
share of 62%. 
 
Table 1: Allocation criteria of formula based VAT transfers 
Allocation criteria 
 Lump sum part Fiscal capacity Tax effort 
Urban 15,50% 69% 15,50% 
Rural 30% 60% 10% 
Études et Documents n° 5, CERDI, 2018
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 Source : Bulletin d’information de la Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales. 
Loans and other resources: in addition to local revenues and transfers, local 
governments have access to loans from the Communal Equipment Fund (FEC). The FEC is a 
bank under the supervision of the central government and is the main source of external 
financing for local authorities. The FEC also provides technical assistance and contributes to 
the promotion of local development. Several criteria need to be met to qualify for FEC loans: 
having a debt ratio below 40% of GDP; being able to generate future surpluses that can cover 
the entire debt service; providing a down payment of at least 20% of the cost of the project to 
be financed; and possessing the human, material and organizational resources to implement 
the project. Finally, both regional and municipal governments have some revenue sources that 
are less predictable and more discretionary, which include royalty payments from natural 
resources and previous years' budget surpluses. 
Loans represent a small share of local revenues and averaged 8% of subnational revenues in 
2009. Contrarily, revenues from other sources represent a significant share of subnational 
budgets as many local governments usually have surpluses from past budget years. The 
existence of these past revenues leads to an unusual situation where subnational expenditures 
are always lower than subnational revenues. Figure 2 summarizes the composition of 
subnational revenues excluding past surpluses over the period 2005-20095. 
 
                                                     
5 See Appendix C for more details. 
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Source: Trésorerie Général du Royaume and authors’ calculations. 
 
IV.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Previous studies have mostly relied on two distinct methods to evaluate public spending 
efficiency. The first method is referred to as the one-stage procedure that jointly estimates 
inefficiencies and their determinants. The second method, considered in this analysis, is the 
two-stage approach which consists on estimating the efficiency scores in the first stage and 
then regressing the estimated efficiency scores on external variables in the second stage of the 
analysis. 
In the first stage, the literature adopts different methodologies usually divided into parametric 
and nonparametric approaches. Coelli, (1996) and Coelli and Perelman, (1999) explains the 
advantages and disadvantages of different methods such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Nonparametric approaches are more appropriate for 
this study as they allow for the use of multiple outputs, which will provide us with the tools to 
measure impacts on multiple outcome variables - poverty, inequality, and vulnerability. They 
also do not require any assumptions on the functional form nor they require information on 
input and output prices. 
 
 
IV.1 DEA methodology  
Developed initially by Charnes et al., (1978) and inspired by the seminal work of Farrell, 
(1957), DEA assumes the existence of a convex production frontier. It imposes only limited 
restrictions on the representation of production technology and allows a comparison of the 
levels of efficiency between entities. The only hypothesis is that it is possible, with the same 
production technologies, to measure an increase in outputs while maintaining the level of 
inputs or to reduce inputs while maintaining outputs constant. This assumption ensures that 
there is a continuum of outputs across the production frontier. The advantage of this method is 
that it provides an intuitive tool for identifying best practices. The approach here is to 
empirically measure the efficiency of a Decision Making Unit (DMU) by calculating the 
distance separating the point representing the values of the factors and the level of services 
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observed with respect to a hypothetical point on the production frontier. In this way, it is 
possible to estimate the degree of efficiency of each entity offering the service in relation to 
that frontier which determines best practices. This allows the identification of the best 
performing DMUs, which can serve as references to those that are less efficient.  
Suppose there are k inputs and m outputs for n regions (DMUs). Let us define xi as the column 
vector of the inputs and qi as the column vector of the outputs for the i-th region; X as the (k×n) 
input matrix and Q as the (m×n) output matrix. The DEA model is then specified as the solution 
to the mathematical programming problem below, for each of the n regions: 
Min θ,λ θ 
Subject to: 
 -qi + Qλ ≥ 0 
θxi – Xλ ≥ 0 
I1'λ ≤ 1 
θ is a scalar (that satisfies θ ≤ 1) and it is the score that assesses technical efficiency of unit (xi, 
qi). It measures the distance between a decision unit and the efficient frontier, defined as the 
linear combination of best-practice observations; when θ < 1, the region is inside the frontier 
(i.e., inefficient), while θ = 1 implies that the region is on the frontier (i.e., fully efficient).  The 
vector λ is a (n×1) vector of constants, which measures the weights used to compute the 
location of an inefficient region if it were to become efficient; the peers are other regions that 
belongs to the best-practice frontier, and are therefore used as benchmarks.  I1 is a n-
dimensional vector of ones, the restriction I1'λ = 1 imposes convexity of the frontier, 
accounting for Variable Returns to Scale DEA-VRS (Banker et al., 1984). Dropping this 
restriction would amount to impose Constant Returns to Scale DEA-CRS (Charnes et al., 
1978). Given that the assumption of CRS has often been considered over restrictive in the 
literature, this paper will compute the efficiency scores of Moroccan regions using an input-
oriented DEA-VRS. A second stage Tobit regression is then used to analyze the determinants 
of these efficiency scores. 
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IV.2 Data 
The analysis is based on a sample composed of 16 regions and 1503 municipalities, and covers 
the period 2005-2009 for which data are available. Disaggregated data on local revenues and 
expenditures were collected from the Trésorerie Générale du Royaume (TGR), a department 
of the Ministry of Finance. Socio-economic and demographic data come from “Le Maroc des 
regions” annual report published by the Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP). Data on living 
standards, poverty, vulnerability, and inequality come from the HCP surveys. Data on human 
resources come from the “Collectivités locales en chiffres” a yearly report published by the 
Ministry of Interior. 
Three indicators are used to measure pro-poor outcomes6: 
 The Gini index measures income inequality and varies between 0 (in the case of perfect 
equality) and 1 (in the case of absolute inequality). This indicator is computed by the 
TGR based on household consumption expenditures. 
 The Poverty rate represents the percentage of individuals whose standard of living is 
below the relative poverty line. In 2004 this threshold was 1687 MAD per month for 
households living in urban areas and of 1745 MAD per month for households living in 
rural areas. 
 The Vulnerability rate is the proportion of the population under the risk of falling into 
poverty; in 2004 this proportion included urban households with a monthly income 
between 1687 and 2531 MAD and rural households whose monthly income is between 
1745 and 2618 MAD. 
Our variables of interests are measured as follows: 
 The size of the local government budget is measured alternatively by subnational total 
revenues and subnational total expenditures in percentage of GDP.  
 The fiscal autonomy of the local government is measured by two proxies; first the share 
of subnational local own revenues over total subnational expenditures. Second, we use 
a broader definition of subnational local revenues that includes also subnational ceded 
revenues. Therefore, the second proxy of fiscal autonomy is computed as the sum of 
                                                     
6 Given that the higher the output measure the lower the performance, the output variables are transformed and 
constructed as follows: 𝑥𝑡 = 100 − 𝑥 ; where x is alternatively one of the three output variables. 
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subnational local own revenues and subnational ceded revenues over subnational total 
expenditures.  
 The transfer dependency is measured as the share of intergovernmental transfers in 
subnational total expenditures. We also distinguish between formula-based transfers 
and ad-hoc transfers. 
 The degree of political decentralization is proxied by several indicators: the share of 
the municipal government expenditures in subnational total expenditures (total, current 
and capital expenditures), the share of the municipal government revenues in 
subnational total revenues, and the regional fragmentation proxied by the number of 
municipalities in each region. 
 As Morocco had local elections during the period covered in this study, we include a 
dummy variable equal to one the year of local elections and zero otherwise. Related to 
these elections, we also exploit the dataset and check whether the level of education of 
the elected officials in the regions, proxied by the share of elected officials that 
achieved at least a secondary level education, affect spending efficiency. 
Finally, we follow the existing literature and include a number of variables in the model to 
control for exogenous factors that may affect spending efficiency: the logarithm of GDP 
per capita, the size of the population, and the degree of urbanization of the regions. 
 
 
V.  RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
V.1 Efficiency scores of Moroccan regions 
 Table 2 summarizes the DEA-VRS input-oriented efficiency scores for the 16 regions in 
Morocco. The average score of 0.76 between 2005 and 2009 and across regions suggests that 
Moroccan regions could have theoretically achieved the same level of output with about 24 
percent fewer inputs. In other words, they could have significantly reduced poverty, 
vulnerability, and inequality without increasing their expenditures. Grand Casa and Oued 
Dahab Lagouira appear to be the most efficient regions while Ghelmim Essmara and Al 
Houceima Taza Taounate are the less efficient with the lowest average scores over the period 
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of 0.46 and 0.47 respectively. These results point to some positive correlations between 
regions' spending efficiency and their GDP and population sizes. On the other hand, there is a 
negative correlation between the number of municipalities in the region and their spending 
efficiency. 
TABLE 2: Regional efficiency scores -- DEA 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean Rank 
GRAND CASA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OUED DAHAB LAGOUIRA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GHARB CHRADA BENI HSSEIN 0,77 1 1 0,79 1 0,91 3 
SOUSS MASSA DARAA 0,9 1 1 0,75 0,8 0,89 4 
LAAYOUNE BOUJDOUR 1 1 0,78 1 0,64 0,88 5 
TADLA AZILAL 1 0,83 0,96 0,9 0,65 0,87 6 
DOUKALA ABDA 1 1 0,87 0,67 0,73 0,85 7 
CHAOUIA OUARDIGHA 0,51 0,68 1 1 1 0,84 8 
MARRAKECH TENSIF AL HAOUZ 0,67 0,7 0,76 1 0,7 0,76 9 
ORIENTAL 0,72 0,78 0,81 0,71 0,79 0,76 10 
RABAT SALE 0,62 0,77 1 0,64 0,73 0,75 11 
FES BOULMANE 0,51 0,69 0,72 0,48 0,62 0,6 12 
MEKNES TAFILALT 0,38 0,54 0,73 0,55 0,62 0,56 13 
TANGER TETOUAN 0,42 0,62 0,65 0,48 0,6 0,55 14 
AL HOUCEIMA TAZA TAOUNATE 0,24 0,57 0,53 0,42 0,58 0,47 15 
GHELMIM ESSMARA 0,38 0,62 0,52 0,35 0,41 0,46 16 
Mean 0,7 0,8 0,83 0,73 0,74 0,76 - 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
   
 
 
 
V.2 Size of local governments and spending efficiency 
The first column of Table 3 presents the results of the baseline Tobit model with the control 
variables. They all appear to be significant determinants of spending efficiency: the coefficient 
for GDP per capita shows that richer regions have more efficient spending. Regarding the size 
of the population, spending efficiency is lower in more populous Moroccan regions, a finding 
which differs from some earlier research (Bahl and Nath, 1986; Oates, 1972). Finally, the 
coefficient for the urbanization variable displays a negative and significant sign, meaning that 
more urbanized regions are less efficient than regions with more rural areas. This can be 
counterintuitive as urbanization is usually expected to improve efficiency (Bahl and Nath, 
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1986). One reason could be that more urbanized regions have more financial resources, which 
can increase inefficient spending. Another explanation could be related to the fact that poverty 
being higher in rural areas compared to the national average, authorities have more room to 
reduce the gap compared to their counterparts in more urbanized areas. 
The second and third columns show estimates from the different measures of the size of the 
regional budget. In both sets of estimates, aggregate revenue and expenditure measures appear 
to have significant and negative relationships with spending efficiency. In other words, regions 
with higher levels of revenues and expenditures compared to their GDP are less efficient in 
reducing inequality, poverty, and vulnerability. Besides, if we compare the effects of aggregate 
shares of expenditure and revenue, the negative impact of the share of expenditures on 
efficiency appears to be more pronounced. These results highlight the importance of calibrating 
redistributive policies by taking into account the economic activity in the regions. For instance, 
while intergovernmental transfers can help mitigate inter-regional disparities by increasing the 
revenues of regions with a relatively lower level of GDP, they can be at the cost of better 
spending efficiency. These transfers need to be accompanied with a broader regional 
development strategy. 
TABLE 3: Subnational budgets and spending efficiency 
Dependent variable: DEA efficiency 
score 
(1) (2) (3) 
Subnational revenues   -0.050**  
  (0.025)  
Subnational expenditures   -0.161*** 
   (0.041) 
GDP per capita 0.480*** 0.339** 0.306* 
 (0.138) (0.149) (0.140) 
Urban dummy -0.210** -0.194* -0.178 
 (0.087) (0.108) (0.125) 
Population -0.127** -0.066 -0.097 
 (0.043) (0.057) (0.065) 
Constant -3.775** -2.058 -0.501 
 (1.329) (1.509) (1.417) 
LR test 7.14 11.05  18.98 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood -13.19 -11.24 -6.62 
N. Obs 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
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V.3 Fiscal autonomy, transfer dependency, and spending efficiency 
In Table 4 we focus on how the different sources of regional revenues and the financing of 
public spending affect efficiency. The results in Column 1 and 2 suggest that fiscal autonomy 
of the regions, whether measured by own revenues only or by own and ceded revenues, 
positively affects spending efficiency; they are in line with earlier findings in Weingast, (2009) 
and Goerl and Seiferling, (2014). However these results differ from those of Balaguer-Coll et 
al., (2004, 2010) who find that a local government that is highly capable of generating own 
revenues would be less motivated to manage them efficiently.  
If we turn to the results for transfer dependency (Table 4, column 3) measured by the share of 
regions' expenditures funded by transfers from the central government, it appears to have a 
negative but insignificant relationship with spending efficiency.  
In sum, Moroccan regions need to rely more on their own-source revenues and less on 
intergovernmental transfers to cover their expenditure needs. In this context, while the central 
government transfers will continue to represent a significant share of local revenues to 
accompany the decentralization process, a greater attention should be paid to developing the 
capacity of local authorities in mobilizing local revenues. 
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TABLE 4: Fiscal autonomy, transfer dependency, and spending efficiency 
Dependent variable: DEA efficiency 
score 
(1) (2) (3) 
Fiscal autonomy (own revenue) 0.007**   
 (0.003)   
Fiscal autonomy  0.005**  
  (0.002)  
Transfers dependency   -0.001 
   (0.003) 
GDP per capita 0.537*** 0.516*** 0.487*** 
 (0.125) (0.120) (0.138) 
Urban dummy -0.251** -0.273*** -0.214** 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.087) 
Population -0.106** -0.123** -0.038 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.059) 
Constant -4.483*** -4.196*** -3.771** 
 (1.217) (1.162) (1.309) 
LR test 6.91 5.97  6.76 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood -9.43 -9.21 -13.15 
N. Obs 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
 
V.4 Transfer conditionality and spending efficiency 
Columns 1 and 2 of table 5 present the results for the effects of formula-based (unconditional) 
and ad hoc (conditional) transfers respectively. It is worth noting that this is the first time such 
a distinction is made to measure the disaggregated effects of transfers on spending efficiency. 
The coefficient associated with formula-based transfers is significant and positive, meaning 
that the higher the share of revenues derived from formula-based transfers the more efficient 
is the region in spending. Conversely, ad hoc transfers seem to be negatively associated with 
spending efficiency.  
There are two possible explanations for these results. On one hand, ad hoc transfers are more 
unpredictable than formula-based transfers, which can make it difficult for local authorities to 
effectively plan and use these resources efficiently. On the other hand, since ad hoc transfers 
are not, by definition, allocated to local authorities on a transparent and regular basis, the latter 
may exhibit less efficient spending behaviors due to the lack of accountability. 
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TABLE 5: Transfer conditionality and spending efficiency 
Dependent variable: DEA efficiency score (1) (2) 
Unconditional transfers dependency 0.007**  
 (0.003)  
Conditional transfers dependency  -0.028*** 
  (0.007) 
GDP per capita 0.400** 0.720*** 
 (0.178) (0.161) 
Urban dummy -0.171 -0.265** 
 (0.116) (0.107) 
Population 0.0575 -0.117** 
 (0.076) (0.059) 
Constant -3.516** -5.743*** 
 (1.598) (1.502) 
LR test  9.96  17.94 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood -11.779 -4.898 
N. Obs 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
 
V.5 Political decentralization and spending efficiency 
The existing empirical research on the impacts of decentralization has mostly considered the 
government as being organized around two large entities: the central government on one hand 
and the subnational government on the other. We go further in this work by disaggregating the 
subnational government into two different sub-entities to see if a greater responsibility of the 
region compared to municipality or vice versa affects the efficiency of spending. We therefore 
use three indicators as proxies of the level of political decentralization: the share of 
expenditures and revenues managed by municipalities and the number of municipalities per 
region.  
The results presented in columns 1-3 of Table 6 show that there is more spending inefficiency 
in regions where municipalities manage a larger share of the subnational expenditures. By 
breaking down these results further, we find that the higher the share of capital expenditures 
managed by municipalities the lower the efficiency of subnational spending; the coefficient 
associated with current expenditures appear to be insignificant. These results are also 
confirmed when we use the share of municipal revenues to subnational revenues (column 4).  
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In the last column of the table 6, we evaluate whether the number of municipalities per region, 
which is an indicator of the political and territorial fragmentation of the region, affects the 
spending efficiency. The results show that, in fact, the most fragmented regions are less 
efficient in reducing inequality, poverty, and vulnerability. 
 
TABLE 6: Political decentralization and spending efficiency 
 
  Dependent variable: DEA 
efficiency score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
        Municipal government total 
expenditures 
-0.013** 
 (0.006)     
Municipal government 
current expenditures 
 -0.028    
  (0.023)    
Municipal government 
capital expenditures 
  -0.008**   
   (0.003)   
Municipal government total 
revenues 
   -0.023***  
    (0.005)  
Regional fragmentation     -0.002* 
     (0.001) 
GDP per capita 0.424** 0.411** 0.438*** 0.366** 0.436*** 
 (0.135) (0.149) (0.127) (0.112) (0.129) 
Urban dummy -0.165** -0.178* -0.208** -0.172** -0.280*** 
 (0.081) (0.092) (0.074) (0.067) (0.083) 
Population 0.037 0.013 0.0435 0.102** 0.040 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.042) (0.044) (0.050) 
Constant -2.169 -0.489 -2.821** -0.946 -3.254** 
 (1.493) (3.007) (1.258) (1.279) (1.258) 
LR test 4.40 7.75  3.63 2.85 5.27 
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 
Log likelihood -10.82 -12.38 -8.06 -3.35 -10.63 
N. Obs 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
The above results show that while moving toward more decentralized systems, the central 
government may need to consider giving the regional entities a more prominent role in 
managing decentralized spending and ensuring territorial coherence. 
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V.6 Spending efficiency in the context of local elections 
In Table 7 we test whether the behavior of incumbent politicians closer to new elections has a 
significant impact on spending efficiency. However, the results need to be interpreted with 
caution as only one round of local elections occurred during the period of study. 
The findings point to a negative and significant impact of local elections on spending efficiency 
(column 1); in other words, the local authorities manage public resources less efficiently the 
year of elections. Our results are in line with the literature on electoral budget cycle which 
states that incumbent politicians tend to increase inefficient public spending in proximity of 
the election year in order to get re-elected (Veiga and Veiga 2007). 
We also assess whether the skills of elected officials (column 2), proxied by their level of 
superior education, play a determining role in explaining expenditure efficiency. The results 
confirm the intuition that when elected officials have at least completed a secondary education 
level the efficiency of spending in the region is improved. One explanation could be that the 
increased ability of the local authorities to formulate and monitor local budgets make public 
spending more efficient. 
 
TABLE 7: Spending efficiency in the context of local elections 
 Dependent variable: DEA efficiency score (1) (2) 
   
Local elections -0.110*  
 (0.060)  
Elected officials with secondary 
education 
 0.024*** 
  (0.006) 
GDP per capita 0.576*** 0.369*** 
 (0.138) (0.104) 
Urban dummy -0.230** -0.253*** 
 (0.084) (0.057) 
Population -0.030 0.048 
 (0.041) (0.032) 
Constant -4.680*** -3.558*** 
 (1.326) (0.946) 
LR test 7.02  0.05  
p-value 0.00 0.40 
Log likelihood -11.49  -4.90 
N.Obs 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
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V.7 Robustness checks 
In this section, we consider various alternative approaches both to the first stage and second 
stage regressions in order to ascertain the robustness of the above findings. As for the first 
stage regressions, we use a Partial Frontier Analysis Order-m (PFA) to compute the efficiency 
scores. In the second stage, we test the validity of the relationships by relying on a Fractional 
Regression Model (FRM). Finally, we also check the consistency of our findings by running a 
pooling regression and by adding additional control variables to the baseline model. 
 
V.7.1 Partial Frontier Analysis and Fractional Regression Model7 
The use of the nonparametric approach to measure local government efficiency has the 
advantage of imposing less structure on the functional form and the ability to accommodate 
multiple inputs and outputs when the sample size is allowing it. However, Full-frontier 
nonparametric estimators such as DEA method envelop all data points and are therefore, highly 
sensitive to outliers, extreme values, and random shocks which can have an effect on the 
efficient frontier. Cazals et al., (2002); Daraio and Simar, (2007) and Tauchmann, (2012) 
suggest estimating partial frontier nonparametric approaches to obtain efficiency scores that 
are less sensitive to outliers. These nonparametric methods, which include the order-α and 
order-m methods, use only part of the observations in the sample to determine efficiency 
scores. In the second stage, the determinants of the PFA Order-m scores are estimated using 
the FRM approach to deal with the limitations associated with Tobit models (Simar and 
Wilson, 2007). 
The Order-m-FRM regression results8 presented in Appendix E are broadly consistent with our 
previous findings. In particular, the size of subnational budgets continues to be negatively 
associated with spending efficiency although the coefficient for regional revenues becomes 
insignificant. The fiscal autonomy of local governments also remains associated with higher 
spending efficiency. The coefficient for transfer dependency, which was insignificant in the 
baseline model, becomes higher, significant, and negatively associated with spending 
efficiency; the impact of both transfers is confirmed and with a higher magnitude. Regarding 
the measures of regional fragmentation, two of the three indicators confirm that spending 
                                                     
7 These models are detailed in Appendix A. 
8 The Order-m regional efficiency scores are presented in Appendix D. 
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efficiency is hampered by regional fragmentation; only the coefficient associated with 
municipal government expenditures becomes insignificant. Finally, there is a robust evidence 
of a relatively low efficiency of spending in elections' year as the Order-m-FRM results show 
an even higher coefficient compared to the baseline model. 
We further tested the robustness of these findings by relaxing the panel structure of our data 
and running a pooled regression. This allows us to generate the efficiency score of each region 
not only compared to the 15 other regions, but to the 79 other observations (16 regions over 5 
years) in the sample. The results presented in Appendix F are consistent with those of the panel 
data regressions. 
V.7.2 Additional control variables 
We estimate the impact of the decentralization variables by expanding the number of additional 
control variables. We added the squared population variable to account for the economies of 
scale and for the hypothesis that there appears to be a critical mass of population and activities 
before the benefits of decentralization can materialize (Prud’homme, 1995). The regional 
density of population is also included as a proxy of the geographical size of regions, as the 
quantity and quality of service delivery may vary in function of the geographical concentration 
or dispersion of individuals.  
Two things are worth noticing in Appendix G. First, adding more independent variables 
increases the goodness of fit of the model in most cases. Second, the results confirm the 
previous findings, although the coefficients measured are larger compared to the baseline 
model. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to assess the efficiency of Moroccan local government spending 
in reducing poverty, inequality, and vulnerability. It investigated the role played by a set of 
variables reflecting the degree of decentralization. The analysis relied on a sample of 16 
regions and 1503 municipalities, and employed a set of nonparametric approaches to study 
efficiency performances and their main determinants. 
Over the last two decades, the Moroccan government has gradually granted the regions with 
increased political, administrative, and fiscal powers in the context of Morocco's advanced 
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regionalization. This paper has shown that regions with high expenditure and revenue to GDP 
ratios display less efficient spending patterns in reducing poverty, inequality and vulnerability. 
As highlighted in the existing literature, the sources of revenues play a crucial role in the 
efficiency of spending and in Morocco, regions that are able to finance a larger part of their 
spending by raising their own revenues are more efficient. Besides, our results do not support 
the hypothesis that overall transfer dependency motivates regions to spend inefficiently. 
However, when transfers are disaggregated, we show that transfers based on a transparent 
allocation formula improve the efficiency of spending, whereas the opposite is true when 
transfers are made in a discretionary way. 
Another important contribution of this paper has been to see whether political decentralization 
and the fragmentation of local governments affect the efficiency of spending. In regions where 
municipalities have a greater responsibility for spending, those spending are made in a less 
efficient fashion. Moreover, regions that are more fragmented also have weaker performance 
in terms of spending efficiency. These results suggest that the regions must be given a more 
prominent role in managing public spending as they can help to maintain territorial coherence 
and serve as intermediate entities between the central government and the municipalities. 
Finally, we tested the existence of the electoral budget cycle in Morocco and political 
accountability. We show that in Morocco, spending efficiency tends to decrease the year of 
local elections. Moreover, when we look more closely at the characteristics of elected officials, 
our results show that the higher their level of education the more efficient is the region in the 
use of public resources. 
In sum, greater decentralization in Morocco should be undertaken in a balanced fashion where 
the region, besides being a stronger political entity, is given a more prominent role in the 
economy compared to municipalities in order to coordinate local policy decisions and their 
externalities. While local authorities are called upon to increase their fiscal autonomy, it 
remains critical for the central government to ensure that transfers are allocated in a transparent 
and efficient way. This will help to achieve a more equal distribution of income and to alleviate 
economic poverty and vulnerability. 
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VIII.  APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Partial Frontier Analysis, Fractional Regression Model 
Nonparametric full frontier methods, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH) estimators are sensitive to outliers and measurement errors, and require 
using a large sample of observations and a limited number of inputs/outputs to get accurate 
results (Daraio and Simar, 2007). 
Cazals et al., (2002); Daraio and Simar, (2007) and Tauchmann, (2012) suggest estimating a 
partial frontier nonparametric approach to obtain efficiency scores that are less sensitive to 
outliers. These nonparametric methods, which include the order α and order-m methods, use 
only part of the observations in the sample to determine efficiency scores. 
The full nonparametric approaches define the best performers in the sample as the efficient 
units, and compares the other DMUs to this benchmark. Instead of benchmarking a decision-
making unit relative to the best-performing peer in the sample, the PFA compares each 
decision-making unit against the best performers in an artificial subsample of m peers 
randomly selected from the sample with replacement. This procedure is repeated n times 
resulting in n pseudo efficiency measures from which the final order-m efficiency measure is 
computed as the average. The parameter m represents the number of units used to benchmark 
performance and determines the degree of robustness of the obtained estimate. A large value 
of m is required to obtain a robust estimator. With order-m, DMUs can be above the production 
frontier, and the scores to be above 1. At small values of m, there will be many observations 
beyond the efficient frontier; however, as the value of m increases, fewer observations will be 
left beyond the frontier. For m approaching infinity, the order-m efficiency estimator converges 
to the full frontier FDH measure.   
As for the choice of the appropriate model for the first stage above, the identification of the 
appropriate model to assess the determining factors of efficiency is crucial to avoid misleading 
results (Simar and Wilson, 2007; Ramalho et al., 2010). Ramalho et al., (2010) argue that the 
linear specification of the second-stage regression may not be appropriate as it violates the 
requirement that the predicted values of efficiency scores lie within a range of 0-1. 
Furthermore, Simar and Wilson, (2007) indicate that the standard approach of using a two-
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limit Tobit model, with limits at zero and unity, is not the best specification to model the 
second-stage regression since few values, if any, are close to 0 but some values of unity.  
To cope with the problems associated with linear and Tobit models, Ramalho et al., (2010) 
suggest to use the FRM developed by Wooldridge, (2002). We follow the instrumentalist 
approach adopted by McDonald, (2009) and Ramalho et al., (2010), which has been also 
implicitly adopted for most two-stage DEA empirical studies. This approach considers the 
scores as observed measures of the relative technical efficiency of the sampled DMUs. 
Therefore, in the second stage, the scores can be treated like any other dependent variable in a 
regression analysis.  
(Ramalho et al., 2010) suggest two frameworks for the second stage FRM9: a single-equation 
model to explain the efficiency scores of all DMUs, including those of the efficient ones; or a 
two-equation model that explains separately, first, why some DMUs are efficient while others 
are not and, second, the relative efficiency of inefficient DMUs. We adopt a single-equation 
model in this work that we will compare to the second-stage Tobit model used in the baseline 
model. The FRM provides several alternative functional forms for dealing with the typical 
asymmetric nature of efficiency scores. We test for the appropriate functional form using 
alternative models including FRM Logit, Probit, log-logistic (Loglog) and Complementary 
log-logistic (cloglog). The P-test is used to select between these different specifications.  In no 
case the test reject any of the tested specification; therefore, we present the most commonly 
used FRM Logit model 10. 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 The order-m scores are normalized to range between 0 and 1. 
10 The results using different specifications are available upon request. 
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APPENDIX B: Regional characteristics 
 
REGION   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AL HOUCEIMA TAZA TAOUNATE      
 GDP (millions) 15909,3 17252,03 16054,7 18050 21400,9 
 Population (millions) 1,815 1,824 1,83 1,838 1,844 
 Number of municipalities 132 132 133 133 133 
DOUKALA ABDA   
 GDP (millions) 26172,04 33873,88 37155,14 45262,78 39831,99 
 Population (millions) 1,995 2,008 2,02 2,033 2,046 
  Number of municipalities 87 87 88 88 88 
FES BOULMANE 
 GDP (millions) 22614,58 24341,73 27121,65 29604,63 32125,14 
 Population (millions) 1,592 1,615 1,637 1,659 1,682 
 Number of municipalities 60 60 60 60 60 
GHARB CHRARDA BENI HSSEIN           
 GDP (millions) 34616,9 35515,03 33755,4 35914,82 41898,6 
 Population (millions) 1,875 1,893 1,912 1,933 1,952 
  Number of municipalities 72 72 74 74 74 
GRAND CASA 
 GDP (millions) 102673,8 105644,1 113310,8 117116,7 138595,1 
 Population (millions) 3,653 3,685 3,718 3,753 3,786 
 Number of municipalities 17 17 18 18 18 
MARRAKECH TENSIF AL HAOUZ           
 GDP (millions) 44527,89 50033,24 56902,46 63312,37 67581,12 
 Population (millions) 3,128 3,159 3,187 3,223 3,252 
  Number of municipalities 213 213 215 215 215 
MEKNES TAFILALT 
 GDP (millions) 27138,35 29105 31966,72 36611,29 38467,66 
 Population (millions) 2,157 2,174 2,191 2,209 2,226 
 Number of municipalities 134 134 132 132 132 
ORIENTAL  
 GDP (millions) 37354,12 40984,18 43910,78 47113,35 53591,95 
 Population (millions) 1,929 1,942 1,955 1,969 1,983 
  Number of municipalities 113 113 114 114 114 
RABAT SALE ZEMMOUR ZAIR      
 GDP (millions) 51264,83 55847,79 60136,09 61816,61 67970,02 
 Population (millions) 2,408 2,453 2,5 2,548 2,599 
 Number of municipalities 50 50 51 51 51 
SOUSS MASSA DARAA  
 GDP (millions) 64039,06 72182,73 77142,05 84669,41 92258,71 
 Population (millions) 3,153 3,198 3,244 3,291 3,337 
  Number of municipalities 236 236 236 236 236 
TADLA AZILAL 
 GDP (millions) 21210,89 23694,64 24698,14 27680,54 31379,98 
 Population (millions) 1,457 1,465 1,472 1,481 1,488 
 Number of municipalities 82 82 82 82 82 
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TANGER TETOUAN 
 GDP (millions) 37674,72 41924,63 43236,22 45140,73 50356,15 
 Population (millions) 2,504 2,545 2,586 2,626 2,668 
  Number of municipalities 97 97 99 99 99 
CHAOUIA OUARDIGHA 
 GDP (millions) 25972,79 29675,37 31519,56 52412,54 43066,68 
 Population (millions) 1,665 1,675 1,685 1,695 1,705 
 Number of municipalities 117 117 114 114 114 
GHELMIM ESSMARA 
 GDP (millions) 8141,39 8179,099 8659,454 8925,711 9524,674 
 Population (millions) 0,468 0,476 0,485 0,492 0,502 
  Number of municipalities 60 60 60 60 60 
OUED DAHAB LAGOUIRA 
 GDP (millions) 1783,957 1969,557 2159,524 2212,47 2535,739 
 Population (millions) 0,109 0,12 0,135 0,136 0,145 
 Number of municipalities 13 13 13 13 13 
LAAYOUNE BOUJDOUR 
 GDP (millions) 6584,319 7120,987 8525,287 12999,03 8937,397 
 Population (millions) 0,264 0,274 0,284 0,291 0,299 
  Number of municipalities 14 14 14 14 14 
Source: Haut-Commissariat du Plan and authors’ calculations. 
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APPENDIX C: Composition of subnational revenues  
 
Resource 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  
MAD 
Million 
% 
MAD 
Million 
% 
MAD 
Million 
% 
MAD 
Million 
% 
MAD 
Million 
% 
Local own 
revenues 
3 730 28% 3 830 25% 4 080 24% 3 600 21% 4 480 21% 
Ceded 
revenues 
3 050 23% 3 930 25% 3 670 21% 3 990 23% 4 490 21% 
Transfers 5 770 4 3% 6 400 41% 7 220 42% 7 830 45% 10 200 48% 
Loans 501 4% 933 6% 1 560 9% 1 440 8% 1 640 8% 
Grants 349 3% 507 3% 570 3% 640 4% 390 2% 
Total 13 400 100% 15 600 100% 17 100 100% 17 500 100% 2 1200 100% 
Source: Trésorerie Générale du Royaume and authors’ calculations. 
Note: revenues excluding past surpluses. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D: Regional efficiency scores – Order-m 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean Rank 
                
GHARB CHRADA BENI HSSEIN 1,16 1,21 1 1 1 1,07 1 
SOUSS MASSA DARAA 1,28 1,13 1,08 0,98 0,85 1,06 2 
RABAT SALE 1,02 1,04 1 1 1 1,01 3 
GRAND CASA 1,02 1,02 1 1 1 1,01 4 
CHAOUIA OUARDIGHA 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 
OUED DAHAB LAGOUIRA 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 
TANGER TETOUAN 0,73 1 1 1 1 0,95 7 
DOUKALA ABDA 1 1 0,98 0,92 0,81 0,94 8 
TADLA AZILAL 1 1 1 0,97 0,66 0,93 9 
ORIENTAL 1 1 0,84 0,92 0,82 0,92 10 
LAAYOUNE BOUJDOUR 1,04 1,01 0,79 1 0,64 0,9 11 
MARRAKECH TENSIF AL HAOUZ 0,76 0,77 0,83 1,06 0,77 0,84 12 
FES BOULMANE 0,86 0,97 0,83 0,65 0,66 0,79 13 
MEKNES TAFILALT 0,55 0,73 0,85 0,76 0,69 0,72 14 
AL HOUCEIMA TAZA TAOUNATE 0,31 0,69 0,58 0,47 0,65 0,54 15 
GHELMIM ESSMARA 0,42 0,72 0,59 0,48 0,44 0,53 16 
Mean 0,88 0,95 0,9 0,89 0,81 0,89 - 
Source: Authors' calculations 
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APPENDIX E: Order-m-FRM regressions 
 Dependent variable: 
Order-m efficiency score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Subnational revenues  -0.049  
     
 (0.045)  
     
Subnational expenditures   -0.200* 
     
 
 (0.111) 
     
Fiscal autonomy (own 
revenue)   
0.032***     
 
  (0.006) 
    
Fiscal autonomy   
 0.018***    
 
  
 (0.003)    
Transfers dependency   
 
 -0.015**   
 
  
 
 (0.007)   
Unconditional transfers 
dependency   
 
  
0.016*** 
 
 
  
 
  (0.004)  
Conditional transfers 
dependency   
 
   
-0.054** 
 
  
 
   (0.021) 
GDP per capita 1.416*** 1.294*** 1.568*** 1.424*** 1.441*** 1.376*** 2.001*** 
 (0.327) (0.317) (0.271) (0.268) (0.324) (0.367) (0.368) 
Urban dummy -0.737*** -0.740*** -0.874*** -0.929*** -0.762*** -0.729*** -0.864*** 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.145) (0.144) (0.155) (0.159) (0.157) 
Population 0.0603 0.003 -0.233** -0.271** -0.110 -0.017 -0.051 
 (0.087) (0.082) (0.094) (0.103) (0.127) (0.129) (0.097) 
Constant -13.06*** -11.43*** -15.56*** -13.77*** -12.35*** -12.22** -18.45*** 
 (3.233) (3.152) (2.667) (2.609) (3.329) (3.902) (3.437) 
R squared 0.387 0.414 0.549 0.537 0.415 0.392 0.440 
AIC 1.017 1.012 0.991 0.993  1.013  1.0169 1.009 
BIC -319.71 -320.1 -321.86  -321.6 -320.1 -319.7 -320.4 
N. Obs 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
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APPENDIX E: Continued 
 
 Dependent variable: Order-m 
efficiency score 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Municipal government total 
expenditures 
-0.010**     
  
 (0.004)       
Municipal government 
current expenditures  -0.020 
 
    
 
 (0.043) 
 
    
Municipal government capital 
expenditures   -0.008     
 
  (0.006)     
Municipal government total 
revenues    
-0.023**  
  
 
   (0.008) 
 
  
Regional fragmentation     -0.004**   
 
    (0.002)   
Local election      -0.636**  
 
     (0.199)  
Elected officials with 
secondary education       
0.037*** 
 
      (0.009) 
GDP per capita 1.473*** 1.481*** 1.462*** 1.350*** 1.326*** 1.764*** 1.184*** 
 (0.333) (0.325) (0.325) (0.328) (0.333) (0.343) (0.324) 
Urban dummy -0.692*** -0.711*** 0.184* -0.660*** -0.864*** -0.792*** -0.723*** 
 (0.172) (0.175) (0.0967) (0.159) (0.159) (0.149) (0.155) 
Population 0.161 0.140 -0.719*** 0.258** 0.257** 0.098 0.253** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.163) (0.106) (0.090) (0.075) (0.088) 
Constant -13.20*** -12.18** -13.35*** -11.07** -12.34*** -16.65*** -12.60*** 
 (3.593) (5.544) (3.277) (3.402) (3.264) (3.333) (3.090) 
R squared 0.383 0.380  0.391 0.408 0.427 0.460 0.448 
AIC  1.018  1.019 1.017  1.014 1.011  1.005  1.008 
BIC -319.6 -319.6 -319.7 -319.99 -320.2 -320.6 -320.4 
N. Obs 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
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APPENDIX F: Order-m-FRM, Pooling regressions 
 Dependent variable: 
Order-m efficiency score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Subnational revenues  -0.030 
 
     
 (0.056)  
     
 Subnational 
expenditures  
-0.231**      
 
 (0.111) 
     
Fiscal autonomy (own 
revenue)   
0.026***     
 
  (0.008) 
    
Fiscal autonomy  
  
 0.014**    
 
  
 (0.005)    
Transfers dependency     -0.003   
 
    (0.009)   
Unconditional transfers 
dependency   
 
  
0.010** 
 
 
  
 
  (0.003)  
Conditional transfers 
dependency   
 
   
-0.049* 
 
  
 
   (0.018) 
GDP per capita 1.905*** 1.708*** 2.019*** 1.896*** 1.953*** 1.994*** 2.304*** 
 (0.324) (0.309) (0.273) (0.271) (0.311) (0.353) (0.374) 
Urban dummy -0.804*** -0.804*** -0.910*** -0.949*** -0.809*** -0.805*** -0.889*** 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.152) (0.157) (0.163) (0.168) (0.156) 
Population 0.0631 -0.0269 -0.188 -0.199 0.0428 0.110 -0.0179 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.136) (0.150) (0.172) (0.164) (0.131) 
Constant -18.17*** -15.57*** -20.08*** -18.53*** -18.57*** -19.38*** -21.83*** 
 (3.261) (3.091) (2.672) (2.607) (3.295) (3.852) (3.420) 
R squared  0.403 0.436 0.487 0.471 0.402 0.402 0.420 
AIC 1.034 1.025 1.014 1.018 1.034 1.034  1.029 
BIC -317.4 -318.1 -318.9 -318.6 -317.4 -317.4 -317.7 
N. Obs 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
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APPENDIX F: Continued 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Order-m efficiency score 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Municipal government 
total expenditures 
-0.020     
  
 (0.016)       
Municipal government 
current expenditures  -0.089* 
 
    
 
 (0.051) 
 
    
Municipal government 
capital expenditures   -0.014**     
 
  (0.007)     
Municipal government 
total revenues    
-0.033***  
  
 
   (0.010) 
 
  
Regional fragmentation     -0.004**   
 
    (0.002)   
Local election 
     
-0.321 
 
 
     (0.257)  
Elected officials with 
secondary education       
0.040** 
 
      (0.012) 
GDP per capita 1.859*** 1.775*** 1.861*** 1.718*** 1.786*** 2.089*** 1.602*** 
 (0.309) (0.304) (0.291) (0.303) (0.323) (0.329) (0.317) 
Urban dummy -0.713*** -0.695*** 0.225* -0.698*** -0.928*** -0.830*** -0.792*** 
 (0.168) (0.171) (0.118) (0.155) (0.164) (0.158) (0.156) 
Population 0.206 0.237* -0.778*** 0.312** 0.231** 0.0857 0.254** 
 (0.138) (0.131) (0.163) (0.121) (0.0990) (0.102) (0.0985) 
Constant -16.32*** -8.772 -17.09*** -14.12*** -17.06*** -20.11*** -17.00*** 
 (3.693) (6.366) (2.977) (3.164) (3.160) (3.151) (2.899) 
R squared 0.417 0.423 0.429 0.453 0.435 0.416 0.463 
AIC 1.031  1.030 1.028  1.024  1.027  1.031 1.022 
BIC -317.6 -317.7 -317.8 -318.2 -317.9 -317.6 -318.3 
N. Obs 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
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APPENDIX G:  DEA-Tobit regressions, Additional variables 
 Dependent variable: 
DEA efficiency score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Subnational revenues -0.052**       
 (0.022)       
Subnational 
expenditures 
 -0.164***      
  (0.038)      
Fiscal autonomy (own 
revenue) 
  0.007**     
   (0.003)     
Fiscal autonomy     0.004**    
   
 (0.002) 
   
Transfers dependency     0.001 
  
    
 (0.003) 
  
Unconditional transfers 
dependency 
   
 
 0.009**  
    
 
 (0.004)  
Conditional transfers 
dependency 
   
 
  -0.029*** 
    
 
  (0.007) 
GDP per capita 0.217 0.085 0.402*** 0.382** 0.391** 0.362** 0.599*** 
 (0.139) (0.132) (0.120) (0.118) (0.132) (0.166) (0.148) 
Urban dummy -0.247** -0.239** -0.270*** -0.281*** -0.254*** -0.241** -0.311*** 
 (0.085) (0.091) (0.073) (0.073) (0.076) (0.103) (0.092) 
Population -0.382** -0.547** -0.376** -0.403** -0.163 -0.098 -0.464** 
 (0.171) (0.188) (0.152) (0.160) (0.159) (0.205) (0.178) 
Population square 0.070 0.107** 0.067* 0.073* 0.025 0.0207 0.082* 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.056) (0.047) 
Density 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004* 0.0008 0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0002) 
Constant -0.607 1.031 -2.958** -2.685** -2.875** -3.152** -4.299** 
 (1.475) (1.404) (1.194) (1.180) (1.348) (1.595) (1.413) 
LR test 7.65 12.60   4.00 3.74  3.75  7.03  13.12  
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood  -4.94 0.67 -4.72 -5.10 -7.75 -4.92 0.47 
N. Obs 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
 
  
Études et Documents n° 5, CERDI, 2018
  43 
APPENDIX G: Continued 
 
 Dependent variable: 
DEA efficiency score 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Municipal government 
total expenditures 
-0.015**       
 (0.006)       
Municipal government 
current expenditures 
 -0.028      
  (0.025)      
Municipal government 
capital expenditures 
  -0.007**     
   (0.003)     
Municipal government 
total revenues 
   -0.022***    
    (0.006)    
Regional fragmentation     -0.0005   
     (0.001)   
Local election      -0.089  
      (0.059)  
Elected officials with 
secondary education 
      0.020** 
       (0.007) 
GDP per capita 0.388** 0.356** 0.391** 0.391*** 0.377** 0.459*** 0.312** 
 (0.128) (0.135) (0.129) (0.113) (0.133) (0.133) (0.119) 
Urban dummy -0.213** -0.232** -0.245*** -0.199** -0.263*** -0.265*** -0.256*** 
 (0.069) (0.078) (0.068) (0.0615) (0.078) (0.073) (0.059) 
Population 0.008 -0.059 -0.022 0.190 -0.195 -0.180 -0.088 
 (0.155) (0.180) (0.139) (0.140) (0.135) (0.131) (0.114) 
Population square -0.009 0.0009 0.001 -0.0369 0.039 0.026 0.029 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.037) (0.035) (0.042) (0.037) (0.0318) 
Density 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Constant -1.711 0.236 -2.336* -1.280 -2.588* -3.410** -2.788** 
 (1.374) (2.965) (1.303) (1.240) (1.345) (1.316) (1.128) 
LR test 1.39  3.94 1.90  0.91  3.75 3.64  0.14 
p-value 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.02  0.02 0.35 
Log likelihood -5.56 -7.17 -3.70 -0.19 -7.77 -6.73 -3.15 
N. Obs 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
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APPENDIX H: Description of variables 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Poverty rate Percentage of urban households living with less 
than 1687 MAD per month and rural households 
living with less than 1745 MAD per month 
 
Vulnerability rate Percentage of urban households with a monthly 
income between 1687 and 2531 MAD and rural 
households with a monthly income between 1745 
and 2618 MAD 
 
HCP 
Income inequality Gini index varying between 0 and 1, 1 being 
perfect inequality 
Population Size of the population 
GDP per capita Regional Gross Domestic Product per capita  
Regional fragmentation Number of municipalities per region 
HCP and authors' 
calculations 
Urbanization dummy Equal to one if more than 20% of municipalities in 
the region are urban municipalities, 0 otherwise 
Subnational 
revenues/expenditures 
Local revenues/expenditures as a share of regional 
GDP 
TGR and authors' 
calculations 
Fiscal autonomy Local own revenues as a share of subnational 
expenditures. A broader definition also includes 
ceded revenues. 
Transfer dependency Intergovernmental transfers as a share of local 
expenditures 
Unconditional/Conditional 
transfers dependency 
Formula-based/Ad-hoc transfers as a share of 
subnational expenditures 
Municipal government 
total/capital/current 
expenditures 
Percentage of municipal government 
total/capital/current expenditures as a share of 
subnational total expenditures 
 
Municipal government 
total revenues 
Percentage of municipal government total 
revenues as a share of subnational total revenues 
Local elections Equal to 1 the year of local elections, 0 otherwise 
Ministry of 
Interior 
Education of elected 
officials 
Percentage of elected officials that have completed 
at least a secondary level education 
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